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INTRODUCTION
Following a period of unprecedented violence against abortion
clinic workers in the mid-1990's, an organization called the American
Coalition of Life Activists (ACLA) created a web site that revealed
certain information about abortion providers who, the site said, were
responsible for the "wanton slaughter of God's children." Among
other things, the web site, known as the Nuremberg Files site,
disclosed the home addresses of the physicians along with descriptions
of their cars and the license plate numbers. As abortion providers
around the country were attacked - some by activists with ties to the
ACLA - the appearance of the victims' names on the web site would
change to indicate whether the victim had been wounded (name
shaded in gray) or killed (strikes through the victim's name).
In this paper, I question some of the assumptions underlying
conventional First Amendment theory and doctrine, which I believe
prevent a successful lawsuit against the ACLA by the abortion
providers. I look at Professor C. Edwin Baker's First Amendment
theory and at Judge Kozinski's opinion in the Ninth Circuit's panel
decision reversing the jury's damages verdict against the ACLA. I
argue that notwithstanding their differences, Baker's theory and
Kozinski's interpretation of precedent are both sustained by a deep
presumption about our ability to engage in disinterested, rational
reflection on the diverse expressive activities that confront us. Both
Baker and Kozinski discount the direct and harmful impact that speech
can have on a listener and insist that constitutional analysis must treat
such harms as imagined or self-imposed. Each of their theories, I
conclude, rests on what I call the paradigm of the stoic listener.
The paradigm of the stoic listener has its place: for instance,
when applied to the facts of the classic incitement and subversion
cases culminating in Brandenburg v. Ohio.] In Brandenburg, the
Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a KKK leader for telling a
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crowd of sympathizers that "there might have to be some revengeance
taken" if the white race continued to be 'suppressed.' 2 The Court held
that only "incitement to imminent lawless action" could properly be
punished under the First Amendment. 3 The stoic listener principle
worked well in Brandenburg because the risk of harm identified in
that case did not involve a direct injury to the listener but an injury to a
third party (i.e. someone other than the speaker or the listener) that
would materialize only if the listener processed, approved, and acted
on the violent message of the speech. The idea behind the holding in
Brandenburg was that we may find the speaker guilty of incitement
only when the harm is imminent, and when we cannot trust that the
listener has sufficient time to process the message. In cases such as
Brandenburg, involving potential harm to third parties, the stoic
listener premise acknowledges the importance of individual autonomy:
out of respect for the listener's autonomy, we will posit that her
choices are her own and not hold the speaker causally or morally
responsible for any injury that the listener may inflict on a third party.
But out of these cases, judges and legal scholars have developed a
principle with sweeping reach not warranted by the facts and limited
holdings of the cases. This principle announces that speech is
generally communicative and harmless, irrespective of how the harm
is identified. This broad principle has been applied to cases where the
injury is more intimately connected with the speaker and the injured
party is the recipient of the speech. Doctrinally, we are stuck with this
principle because the Court has categorized particular types of
expression as deserving of protection by the First Amendment.
Protected, that is, against any challenges, including those launched by
new victims who have suffered a different kind of harm and seek their
remedy under new laws.
The Supreme Court's method of broadly categorizing areas of
protected speech prevents legislatures from remedying harms even
when the government has a compelling interest in doing so, and when
the constitutional value of the speech is tenuous or difficult to identify.
Brandenburg was ostensibly a test case for a particular kind of speech
in a certain context, potentially threatening to cause a specific harm.
But in the name of the categorizing approach, the Supreme Court and
the circuit courts have used this case to provide sweeping protection
2 Jd. at 445-446.
3 Id. at 449.
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for certain forms of speech even when the speech harm identified
bears no resemblance to that in Brandenburg. Where the harm is the
injury to private individuals caused, for example, by intimidation,
harassment and threats - instead of the public harm associated with
subversive advocacy, the courts should abandon the Brandenburg
doctrine, acknowledge the performative qualities of communicative
speech that have been identified by the lawmakers, and weigh the
advantages and disadvantages of allowing the speech. This would
achieve a pragmatically sound solution that is in accord with how the
courts treat other constitutional rights, for example under the Equal
Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Broadly speaking, the thesis of this paper is that both Professor
Baker's First Amendment theory and Judge Kozinski's doctrinal
approach are ill-equipped to deal with cases where the legislature has
identified a particular form of intimidating or threatening speech and
seeks to remedy the harm that such speech can cause to the recipient.
I begin by describing the philosophy behind Professor Baker's so-
called liberty theory and his discussion of what boundaries we may
properly place on prohibiting threatening speech. I then analyze Judge
Kozinski's opinion in Planned Parenthood v. ACLA 4 (the case
mentioned above) and his use of Brandenburg and another important
Supreme Court decision, NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.5 I argue
that both Baker's and Kozinski's analyses are unsuitable for
addressing the harms suffered by the abortion providers, and conclude
that we should recognize these harms as a genuine injury not
deserving of protection under the First Amendment.
PROFESSOR BAKER'S LIBERTY THEORY
To understand Professor Baker's theory it is helpful to contrast
it with the traditional "marketplace" justification for protecting speech
under the First Amendment. Under the marketplace theory all
information - whether true or false - is considered a utility that helps
us seek and acquire knowledge. Information gets processed in the
competition of the market, in which ideas are exposed to a robust
debate that refines our convictions. The marketplace theory assumes
4 Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette Inc. v. American Coalition of Life
Activists, 244 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2001), reh'g en banc granted, 268 F.3d 908
(2001).
5 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2002
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that "life is an experiment" and that the "best test of truth is the power
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market."
6
On this view, people are rational agents who should be allowed freely
to contemplate, adopt or reject various assertions about the world. As
Frederick Schauer puts it: "Listening to other positions, suspending
judgment ... and considering the possibility that we might be wrong
virtually defines, in many contexts, the process of rational thinking."
7
The search for knowledge and truth is best served by affording broad
legal protection to speech, because exposure to falsehoods helps to
strengthen our convictions that the received opinions are correct.
For Professor Baker, by contrast, the principal first amendment
value is self-fulfillment, by which he means the liberty to pursue "self-
determined processes of self-realization." 8 Unlike the marketplace
theory, Baker's self-realization model does not take propositional
speech (that is, speech that makes factual assertions or proposes a
particular viewpoint) to be the paradigmatic instance of speech.
Instead, Baker recognizes that we often use speech in other ways than
to make factual assertions: we use speech to define and develop who
we are. Baker's liberty theory is thus concerned with the broad goal of
allowing individuals to express themselves without inhibition. Speech
should be protected as a means of promoting individual self-
development. Prohibitions on speech, Baker thinks, generally stifle
such development and disrespect the autonomy of both speaker and
listener. Under Baker's theory, both non-propositional and
propositional speech can be granted protection because we are not
seeking the truth but rather a channel for self-fulfilling speech
conduct.
To illustrate the primacy of self-development over other
values, Baker uses an interesting example. Consider, he says, a
protester who participates in a demonstration against the Vietnam war,
"without any expectation that her speech will affect the continuance of
war or even that it will communicate anything to people in power;
6 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
7 Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry, reprinted in THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: A READER 65, 69 (John H. Garvey and Frederick Schauer eds., 2nd
ed. 1996).
8 C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L.
Rev. 964, 991 (1978) [hereinafter Baker, Scope of the First Amendment]. See also
C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH, ch. 3 (1989)
[hereinafter BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY].https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol6/iss1/4
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rather, she participates and chants in order to define herself publicly in
opposition to the war ... independent of any effective communication
to others." 9  Whereas the marketplace theory seeks to improve our
access to information and knowledge in order to maximize utilitarian
benefits, the liberty theory privileges the role that expression has in
shaping the self-identity of the speaker, regardless of the consequences
the speech may have on others.' 0
Baker bolsters his claim by arguing that the legitimacy of our
legal order is intertwined with, and dependent on, the self-fulfillment
ideal. The State, his argument goes, can rightfully expect its citizens
to consent to its laws only if it respects their "moral autonomy," or
capacity to consent.' Baker also ties the idea of respecting people's
autonomy to the view of American constitutionalism as concerned
with protecting individual rights from majoritarian rule. 12 The idea is
that the First Amendment should stick up for the individual against
overreaching legislatures. So far, so good.
The problem with Baker's theory lies not in his ideals; instead,
the problem is how he frames the relationship between speech and the
harm it can cause. In discussing the potential effects of speech on a
listener he writes, "[t]he key quality distinguishing most harms caused
by protected speech acts from most harms caused by unprotected
9 Baker, Scope of the First Amendment, supra note 8, at 994.
10 If the significance of the free exercise of speech is self-fulfillment, and self-
fulfillment is an adequate purpose of the speech exercise, then allowing free speech
may be an effective method of preserving social order and the status quo. Under
Baker's theory, social change will be not be achieved because self-definition is a
false proxy for achieving real change. The Vietnam War protester may chant and
march all she wants, so long as she goes home at the end of the day, fulfilled and
happily self-defined. Justice Brandeis offered a related perspective on the
connection between allowing expressions of dissent and preserving social order:
"Those who won our independence ... knew ... that it is hazardous to discourage
thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breads
hate; that hate menaces stable government...." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). On this view, freedom of speech may serve
the interest of those in power because it avoids the repression of dissent that could
trigger more surreptitious and violent means of expression. Learned Hand made a
similar point when, suggesting that the prosecutions of Communist leaders during
the Red Scare were ill-advised, he remarked that "'[t]he blood of martyrs is the seed
of the church."' GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 603 (1994).
" C. Edwin Baker, Harm, Liberty, and Free Speech, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 979, 1014-
17 (1997) [hereinafter Baker, Harm]; see also, BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY, supra note
8, at 48-51.
12 BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY, supra note 8, at 50.
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activities is that speech-caused harms typically occur only to the extent
that people "mentally" adopt perceptions or attitudes."'1 3 I believe this
is true of the type of third-person harm that is the paradigmatic harm
for the marketplace theorists - i.e. a speaker whose advocacy
persuades a listener to commit a criminal act will not be held liable,
because we want to treat the listener as a rational being, alone
responsible for his actions. This paradigm of harm to third persons is
the starting point for Baker, as it is for the marketplace theory.
Although Baker has come to recognize the direct harmful impact that
speech can cause to a listener, 14 he views the two forms of harm
through the same lens: second and third-party harms alike occur only
to the extent that the listener "responds" a certain way to the speech.
1 5
"Speech," Baker argues, "differs from most other harm-producing
conduct in the way it causes harm."' 16 He offers the following example
as an illustration:
A speaker's racial epithet or a spuming lover's
disavowal of affection harms the hearer only through
her understanding of the message. The harm occurs
because the speech expresses (or, at least, is understood
to express) the speaker's values and visions; and it
occurs only to the extent that the hearer (mentally)
responds one way rather than another, for example, as a
victim rather than as a critic of the speaker. Despite the
predictable and understandable occurrence of serious
harm, the possibility always exists for a hearer to use
the available information in creating or maintaining an
affirmative identity ... The hearer must determine a
response. Whether harm occurs depends on that
response.
Baker's argument fails because the harms it identifies as
particular to speech are really no different from many of the harms
"3 Id. at 55-56.
14 Compare Baker's citations to the saying "sticks and stones may break my bones
but names will never hurt me" in 1978, treating the saying as instructive of the
popular belief in how speech functions, with his statement in 1989, rejecting the
saying as overstating the case. See id. at 55; and see Baker, Scope of the First
Amendment, supra note 8, at 997 n.4.
15 Baker, Harm, supra note 8, at 990-92.
16 BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY, supra note 8, at 55.
17 Baker, Harm, supra note 8, at 991-92.
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caused by physical violence and other physical conduct. It is tempting
to treat physical and non-physical behavior as completely separate;
after all, physical harm is particular to physical conduct and cannot be
caused, in the strict meaning of the word, by non-physical conduct - at
some point someone has to do something to cause the physical harm to
occur. Speech is treated differently because it does not have the same
tangible consequence of directly altering the physical world.
But the same cannot be said about the relationship between
physical conduct and non-physical harm because non-physical harm is
not particular to non-physical conduct. Put another way, the harm in
speech is not unique to speech. Consider, for example, the harm in
rape. That harm surely involves physical damage produced by
physical means. The harm also involves an infringement on the
victim's freedom. But rape also involves a psychological harm to the
victim, without the presumption of which we would never think to
impose twenty-year prison sentences on convicted rapists. This
psychological harm is something other than the physical harm directly
caused by the assault and battery that constitute the physical act of
rape - that is, the perpetrator's physical violence against the victim.
Certainly much of the harm is caused by these physical acts, but most
of the harm is presumed to be psychological. The rape victim often
feels violated in a more serious way than the victim of an aggressor
who inflicts a more permanent physical injury, or who deprives the
victim of her freedom for a longer time. As R.A. Duff has explained,
"rape constitutes a grievous attack on, or invasion of, [the victim's]
sexual integrity and autonomy; this is the 'harm' which rape
essentially involves." 18  Yet under Baker's theory, it would be
tempting to say that the extra-physical harm to rape victims is self-
imposed because it derives from the victim adopting "certain
perceptions and attitudes" about the physical violence, her own body,
and her "idea" of dignity and autonomy. Baker would probably
respond that rape is nonetheless different because it involves a
physical violation of the victim's autonomy where speech, without
more, does not. But my point is simply that Baker is wrong when he
characterizes the harm in speech as particular to speech. So, based
only on a distinction between harms caused by speech and harms
caused by violence, there is no reason to treat speech differently.
18 R.A. Duff, Intentions Legal and Philosophical, 9 OXFORD J. OF LEG. STUD. 76, 90
(1989).Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2002
Except for the immediate physical harm done to a victim of violent
rape, the harm in speech and in conduct alike requires the victim to
adopt, mentally, a certain perception. And yet, rape laws have never
been understood as implicating First Amendment concerns. 19 Unless
Baker would be willing to concede that rape laws "disrespect[ ] the
responsibility and freedom" of the victim in so far as the laws attribute
to the victim certain psychological harm, his argument must be
rejected.
Rape, of course, is not speech: the harm in rape is caused by
physical violence, not by words. But the criminal law does account
for harms that would not occur absent mental intermediation by the
victim. Sticks and stones do more than break one's bones, and
because we allow punishment based on our understanding of that
additional, non-physical harm, we cannot say that speech harms are
distinct from harms caused by physical conduct.
Baker's liberty theory does make room for an exception to the
general stoic listener principle ,that underlies his theory. Invoking his
general concern for individual autonomy, Baker says that "respecting
the listener's integrity as an individual normally requires treating the
listener as responsible for her conduct unless she has been coerced or
forced into the activity. ' 2° Baker thus defines unprotected, coercive
speech as speech "used to influence another person ... if the speaker
manifestly disrespects and attempts to undermine the other person's
will and the integrity of the other person's mental processes., 21 Baker
studies two types of threats: blackmail and whistle blowing. If A tells
B, who has committed a crime, "I will tell the police what you did
unless you give me $100," Baker argues that A's speech does not
deserve First Amendment protection because the speech undermines
and disrespects the autonomy of the listener.22 If, on the other hand, A
tells B, "I will tell the police if you keep breaking the law," A's speech
should be protected because it does not disrespect the "listener's
integrity."
23
For Baker, everything turns on this autonomy enhancing
principle. Speech generally does not interfere with the listener's right
and ability to decide for herself whether to react or act a certain way in
19 See CATHERINE MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 94 (1994).
20 BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY, supra note 8, at 55.
21 Id. at 59.
22 ld. at 60.
23 Id. at 60.
JLASC [Vol. 6: 55
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol6/iss1/4
2002] STOIC LISTENERS? 63
response to the speech. Indeed, Baker thinks, it would be disrespectful
not only to the speaker's integrity but also to the listener's if we were
to prohibit speech on the presumption that the listener cannot decide
for herself what to think, feel and do. The one exception Baker
identifies is coercive speech. But the kind of threats Baker has in
mind are not the kind at issue in the Nuremberg Files case. The harm
inflicted on the abortion providers by those responsible for the web
site was not a matter of coercion. As Professor Kent Greenawalt has
pointed out:
[Tihe point of most threats is not to give the listener
helpful information but to put him in a state of fear, and
the emotional outlet of the threat is not so different
from the emotional outlet of an actual physical assault.
• . damage depends not only on whether the feared
substantive harm occurs, but also on how a vulnerable
human being will feel if he must live in the shadow of
the threat.24
Greenawalt's point is related to my point about the stoic listener.
Though Baker renounces the propositional speech paradigm at the
heart of the marketplace theory, his discussion of coercion is anchored
in that same paradigm. When he discusses blackmail and whistle
blowing, Baker is concerned exclusively with the propositional value
of speech: namely, how the information relayed from speaker to
listener can be processed. Baker wants a First Amendment exception
for blackmail because the listener cannot help but contemplate the
factual assertion of the speech. The speaker forces the listener to react
and respond by changing the situation for the listener. Thus, Baker
does not want to sway from the premise of the stoic listener but rather
is willing to concede only that some propositional speech may warrant
prohibition, exactly because of how that speech communicates its
message.
The liberty theory and the marketplace theory share a single
premise when it comes to "speech harms:" the assumption that the
listeners, the recipients of the speech, are stoically disinterested, with
no personal investment in the truth or falsehood of the speech. The
marketplace theory, concerned only with propositional speech,
24 KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE, 290-91
(1989).
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presumes a detached listener who is willing and able rationally to
distinguish falsehoods from truths. This listener is supposed to be
capable of remaining continually open to all possibilities, her own
inquisitiveness operating, much like the First Amendment itself, on the
assumption that "there is no such thing as a false idea."25 And, so the
argument goes, the First Amendment teaches us tolerance by ignoring
26the self-imposed harm of intolerant listeners. The liberty theory also
generally denies the existence of a constitutionally cognizable speech
harm. It does so by claiming that speech injures only in so far as the
victim reacts a certain way, and because she is generally not forced by
the speaker to react that way, her autonomy is better respected by
affording the speech constitutional protection. Consequently,
Professor Baker's liberty theory promotes using the First Amendment
as a constitutional bar to a finding of proximate causation of harm.
The question of causation becomes crucial in the next section, in
which I analyze Judge Kozinski's opinion in the Nuremberg Files anti-
abortion case.
JUDGE KozrNsKI's OPINION IN
PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. ACLA
As alluded to above, some of the abortion providers who were
identified on the Nuremberg Files web site sued the ACLA for
damages and a jury awarded them over $100 million, mostly in
punitive damages.27 The plaintiffs had sued under the federal
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE), which imposes
criminal and civil liability on anyone who "by force or threat of force.
. . intentionally injures, intimidates or interferes with any person
because that person is ... obtaining or providing reproductive health
services."
28
25 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974) (Justice Powell, writing the
opinion of the Court).
26 Compare with Justice Black's majority opinion in Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252, 278 (1941) (speaking of minds of "reasonable fortitude," unaffected by
vigorous criticism); and Justice Brandeis' concurrence in Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (praising the "courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in
the power of free and fearless reasoning").
27 Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life
Activists, 41 F.Supp.2d 1130 (Oregon 1999)
28 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2002)
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At trial, plaintiffs testified to the terrifying impact that the
Nuremberg Files had on abortion providers everywhere. The fear of
being targeted by a violent anti-abortion terrorist led several clinic
workers to wear bulletproof vests, even while at home, and in some
cases, to seek psychological counseling.
29
Last year, a three-member panel of the Ninth Circuit vacated
the jury's verdict on First Amendment grounds. Writing for the
court, Judge Kozinski purported to analyze and reject the arguments
that the case could fall under either the incitement or the threats
exceptions to First Amendment protection, as articulated by the
Supreme Court. Citing Brandenburg, Judge Kozinski made short
work (and rightly so) of any argument that the speech at issue
constituted unprotected incitement: "If the First Amendment protects
speech advocating violence, then it must also protect speech that does
not advocate violence but still makes it more likely." 31 Kozinski's
reliance on NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,32 however, requires a
more careful analysis.
The plaintiffs in Claiborne were white storeowners who
claimed to have lost business because of a NAACP sponsored boycott
of their stores. The storeowners sued the NAACP for tortious
interference with their businesses. The plaintiffs argued, among other
things, that NAACP leaders had intimidated and threatened black
patrons of the stores, who would have continued to patronize the stores
if not for the threats made by the civil rights leaders. One local
NAACP leader, Charles Evers, for instance, once reportedly urged a
large crowd to support the boycott, stating, "If we catch any of you
going in any of them racist stores, we're gonna break your damn
neck., 33 Certain "store watchers" would also identify patrons who
violated the boycott and have their names read at local NAACP
meetings. 34 Ruling that the First Amendment prevented the plaintiffs
from recovering damages against the NAACP, the Supreme Court in
Claiborne vacated the lower court's verdict against the organization.
29 41 F.Supp.2d at 1154
30 Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette Inc. v. American Coalition of Life
Activists, 244 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2001), reh 'g en banc granted, 268 F.3d 908 (9th
Cir. 2001).
31 Id. at 1015.
32 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
33 Id. at 902.
34 Id. at 903-04.
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In ACLA, Kozinski analogized to the facts in Claiborne and
concluded that the "First Amendment protects ACLA's statements no
less than the statements of the NAACP. 35 Kozinski wrote that the
Court in Claiborne "held that the statements were protected because
there was insufficient evidence that Evers had 'authorized, ratified, or
directly threatened acts of violence."' 36 But the Supreme Court in
Claiborne did not rule that as a matter of the First Amendment, the
intimidating speech was protected and non-actionable. The Court's
opinion rested not on a broad principle of a constitutionally protected
right to make the type of speech Evers made; instead, the ruling was
rooted in the plaintiffs' failure to prove with adequate precision the
causal connection between the threatening speeches and the plaintiffs'
subsequent loss of business. This is not to say that Claiborne was not
decided on First Amendment grounds. Rather, it means that
Claiborne's jurisprudence was very much concerned with the harm
resulting from the speech - in this case, concluding that a connection
between the speech and the harm had not been proven.
37
Prefacing its causation analysis, the Claiborne court stated,
"While the State legitimately may impose damages for the
consequences of violent conduct, it may not award compensation for
the consequences of nonviolent, protected activity. Only those losses
proximately caused by unlawful conduct may be recovered.,38 The
Court's subsequent causation analysis demonstrates that Kozinski is
wrong to read Claiborne as extending broad First Amendment
protection to a form of speech. The Court in Claiborne went on to say
that the findings of the court below (the Mississippi Supreme Court)
were "inadequate to assure the 'precision of regulation' demanded by
[the First Amendment] ... [A]ll of respondents' losses were not
proximately caused by violence or threats of violence."
39
35 244 F.3d at 1014.
36 244 F.3d at 1014 (citing Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 929).
" This is not to say that had there been a more easily discernible connection between
the speech and the harm, the Court would have ruled in favor of the white
storeowners. In such a case, the Court would most likely have adopted a different
strategy so as to ensure the same result: absolving the black civil rights leaders
fighting a historic battle for equality. In any event, this is beside the point - namely,
that the actual holding in Claiborne does not support extending First Amendment
protection to speech irrespective of the harm it causes.
38 458 U.S. at 918 (italics added).
391 Id. at 921-22.
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The Court's lengthy discussion of whether the plaintiffs' loss
of business was caused by Charles Evers' threats or the reading aloud
of the store watchers' notes tells us three important things about how
useless the Claiborne opinion should have been to Judge Kozinski in
deciding the Nuremberg Files case. First, the Claiborne Court's
causation analysis should remind us that the defendants escaped
liability because the plaintiffs, whose burden it was to prove how
much of their business loss could be attributed to non-protected
threats, did not present any evidence tailored to meet this burden. This
means that Kozinski was wrong to interpret the holding in Claiborne
as extending protection to an entire type of speech. We can speculate
about what the Court would have done had the plaintiffs presented
evidence of how much business they lost because of threats against
black patrons. But such speculation does not change Claiborne's
holding. Kozinski overstated that holding and the applicability of
Claiborne to the facts in ACLA. 4°
Second, the white store owners in Claiborne were situated very
differently from the abortion providers in ACLA. Consider what
would have happened if after the decision in Claiborne, black
individuals who felt intimidated by the threatening speeches had sued
the NAACP and Mr. Evers on a theory of infliction of emotional
distress - or, more generally, based on an anti-threats statute which
made intimidating speech actionable. If Kozinski were right, and
Claiborne established, as a matter of speech type protection, that the
threatening speech was constitutionally protected, why did the
Claiborne Court bother to analyze, at length, the lack of proof that the
intimidating speech had proximately caused a loss of business for the
white storeowners? If Evers had a right to intimidate, regardless of
whether his speech caused any harm, why spend so much time
discussing whether his speech had in fact caused the alleged harm?
Moreover, if Kozinski were right, and Claiborne protected Mr. Evers'
speech against any liability, then the black plaintiffs seeking to recover
under an anti-threats law would automatically be barred from bringing
suit. In that case, the threatened blacks should have been required to
40 There is, concededly, a risk that the jury verdict in A CLA, like that in Claiborne,
reflected damages for conduct or speech beyond that which the FACE statute
proscribed. After all, in settling on $107 million the jury may well have considered,
for instance, how news reports of violence against abortion clinics (reports that are
constitutionally protected and, moreover, beyond the defendant's control) may have
contributed to the fear experienced by the plaintiffs.
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join the original suit by the white storeowners, which of course they
were not. In short, the Court's discussion of the causal connection
between the speech and the harm would be ineffectual and pointless
unless the speech could have been actionable under other
circumstances.
Third, the Claiborne Court's causation analysis supports my
thesis that the harm to third parties is importantly different from the
harm to a second party. The district court in the ACLA case
determined that the trial jury appropriately found the Nuremberg Files
web site responsible for causing harm to the abortion providers - harm
not in the form of lost profits but psychological harm resulting from
the fear instilled in the plaintiffs. The abortion clinic workers in ACLA
suffered real harm - unlike in Brandenburg, where by the time the
KKK leader was tried it was clear that the speaker had not in fact
succeeded in inciting violence; or in Claiborne, where likewise no
provable harm materialized.
Even if Kozinski is right to read Claiborne as granting broader
First Amendment protection than I have suggested, his reliance on
Claiborne is nonetheless misplaced. As noted earlier, Kozinski
interpreted Claiborne as holding that Charles Evers' speech was
protected because he had not "authorized, ratified, or directly
threatened acts of violence. 4 1 Kozinski's argument is relevant only in
so far as we define the harm in threats as contingent on the likelihood
that the threatened physical harm will result. But as Professor
Greenawalt has pointed out, the harm in speech can also be located in
how the victim feels when forced to "live in the shadow of the
threat. 4 2  Judge Kozinski, like Professor Baker, ignores this
distinction, which lies at the heart of my argument that both the liberty
theory and Judge Kozinski's opinion in ACLA rely on the limited
speech paradigm of the stoic listener.
So far, I have tried to reframe the discussion of the harm in
speech. My focus has been on the psychological harm to the recipient
of the speech. But the ACLA case also raises an interesting question
about the proper limits of liability for bringing about such harm.
Judge Kozinski addressed this question in a footnote in which he
distinguished between two types of frightening speech.43 One type is
blackmail, which Kozinski defines as a warning that unless the victim
41 244 F.3d at 1014.
42 GREENAWALT, supra note 24, at 291.
4' 244 F.3d at 1015 n.8.
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does what is asked of him, the speaker will bring about some
undesirable event. This is the same type of speech that Baker calls
"coercive" and wants to exclude from First Amendment protection.
The second type of frightening speech mentioned by Kozinski is
exemplified by someone telling a person, "If you smoke cigarettes you
will die of lung cancer." 44 This statement is different from blackmail,
Kozinski explains, because it is merely predictive of an undesirable
event outside the control of the speaker.45 Kozinski wants us to think
of the Nuremberg Files web site as falling into this latter category of
speech. After all, the ACLA did not warn that it would commit
violence against the abortion providers. The insinuation on the web
site was at most that some other party might use the personal
information about the clinic workers in committing an attack against
them. Surely, Kozinski seems to say, because the occurrence of the
insinuated or predicted harm was beyond the control of the ACLA,
any fear instilled in the plaintiffs would be qualitatively
indistinguishable from the fear felt by a smoker who is warned about
the dangers of smoking. In Kozinski's view, the jury should have
imposed liability only "if it understood the statements as expressing
their [the defendants'] intention to assault the doctors but not if it
understood the statements as merely encouraging or making it more
likely that others would do so.
'46
Judge Kozinski's argument is clever: it combines his intuitive
distinction between coercive and predictive threats with
Brandenburg's rule against imposing liability for inciting or
encouraging third parties to commit violence. In other words,
Kozinski determined that the ACLA could not be held liable for
inciting others to commit violence against the abortion providers; nor
could it be held liable for intimating to the plaintiffs that parties
outside the ACLA's control might commit violence against them.
But the speech at issue in the Nuremberg Files was not a
simple "predictive" threat. Even if we suppose that the jury did not
understand the statements on the web site as expressing the ACLA's
intention to commit acts of violence against the abortion providers,
this does not justify thinking of the speech as merely "predicting" or
intimating that the targeted abortion clinic workers might be harmed.
The fear and distress experienced by the plaintiffs was caused by a
44 Id. at 1015 n.8.
45 Id. at 1015 n.8.
46 Id. at 1016.
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combination of factors related to how the web site was perceived. The
jury may have determined that plaintiffs feared that the persons
responsible for the web site had been involved in past attacks on
abortion clinics, and that by disclosing personal information about
abortion providers, the site facilitated attempts by anti-abortion
sympathizers to target and commit acts of violence against them.
Brandenburg, of course, is usually understood as protecting speech
even if it increases the likelihood that violence will follow. But that is
because the harm that the statute in Brandenburg identified was the
actual physical injury that the speaker threatened. If the KKK leader's
conviction in Brandenburg had been upheld, that would have been
akin to finding him causally responsible for any violence that was
committed in the wake of his speech.47 In reversing his conviction it
was as if the Court created a constitutional bar preventing a jury from
finding that the speech was the proximate cause of any subsequent
harm. In the ACLA case, on the other hand, the relevant harm was in
the fear experienced by the targeted abortion providers who quite
reasonably thought that the Nuremberg Files increased the likelihood
of violence. Holding the ACLA liable for causing this fear is thus
distinct from holding it liable for having incited violence against the
plaintiffs. Although Brandenburg prevents lawmakers from holding a
speaker responsible for increasing the likelihood that physical harm
will be inflicted by a third party, that case should not be seen as
precluding liability for a speaker who causes a listener to fear that the
speech increases the likelihood of physical harm.
CONCLUSION
The harm at issue in the Nuremberg Files case is analytically
distinct from the harm in the typical incitement case. The injury in the
former is the speech recipient's fear of physical harm, whereas the
injury in the latter lies in the probability that a third party will suffer
physical harm inflicted by a recipient of the speech. First Amendment
doctrine properly protects inciting speech that creates this latter type of
harm. I have suggested that both doctrine and Professor Baker's
liberty theory rest on the paradigm of stoic listeners, and that this
paradigm should be abandoned in cases involving second-party speech
harms.
47 Incidentally, his speech was not followed by any acts of violence.
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